Administrative procedure by Uhlmann, Felix
Zurich Open Repository and
Archive
University of Zurich
Main Library
Strickhofstrasse 39
CH-8057 Zurich
www.zora.uzh.ch
Year: 2018
Administrative procedure
Uhlmann, Felix
DOI: https://doi.org/10.24921/2018.94115924
Posted at the Zurich Open Repository and Archive, University of Zurich
ZORA URL: https://doi.org/10.5167/uzh-167334
Book Section
 
 
The following work is licensed under a Creative Commons: Attribution 4.0 International (CC BY 4.0)
License.
Originally published at:
Uhlmann, Felix (2018). Administrative procedure. In: Thommen, Marc. Introduction to Swiss Law.
Berlin: Carl Grossmann Verlag, 219-244.
DOI: https://doi.org/10.24921/2018.94115924
Felix Uhlmann
Administrative Procedure1
I. Legal Sources  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .221
1. Historical Developments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .221
2. Constitutional Framework . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 222
3. Federal Act on Administrative Procedure and Cantonal Laws.  . 223
II. Procedural Rights and Principles Administrative Action .  . .  . .  . .  . 225
1. Administrative Action. .  . .  . .  . .  . .  . .  . .  . .  . .  . .  . .  . .  . .  . .  . .  . .  . 225
2. Right to be Heard . .  . .  . .  . .  . .  . .  . .  . .  . .  . .  . .  . .  . .  . .  . .  . .  . .  . .  . 226
3. Right to a Decision Within Reasonable Time . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 228
4. Right to Legal Aid and to Counsel .  . .  . .  . .  . .  . .  . .  . .  . .  . .  . .  . .  . 228
5. Right to Appeal  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 229
6. Right to Challenge Legislation. .  . .  . .  . .  . .  . .  . .  . .  . .  . .  . .  . .  . .  . 230
III. Institutional Framework . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 232
1. Administrative Authorities . .  . .  . .  . .  . .  . .  . .  . .  . .  . .  . .  . .  . .  . .  . 232
2. Courts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 233
3. Other Bodies and Procedures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 236
4. European Perspective  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 237
IV. Landmark Cases .  . .  . .  . .  . .  . .  . .  . .  . .  . .  . .  . .  . .  . .  . .  . .  . .  . .  . .  . .  . 238
1. Necessity of Issuing an Administrative Decision: IWB.  . .  . .  . .  . 238
2. Procedural Fairness: Naturalisation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 239
3. Direct Challenge of Legislation: Police Act of Zurich . . . . . . . . . 240
4. “Legal Sausage Salad” or the Importance of the ECHR . . . . . . . . 242
Selected Bibliography . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 244
© 2018 Felix Uhlmann, CC-BY 4.0, DOI: 10.24921/2018.94115924.09
1 This chapter is an updated version of a treatise previously published by the author, see 
Fؘ؟؜ث f؛؟ؠؔءء, The principle of effective legal protection in Swiss administrative law, 
in: Zoltán Szente/Konrad Lachmayer (Ed.), The Principle of Effective Legal Protection in 
Administrative Law, A European Comparison, London 2017, pp. 304.

221
I. Lƣƨƞl dƺǀƽơƣƾ
ᇳ. H؜ئاآإ؜ؖؔ؟ Dؘةؘ؟آأؠؘءائ
The Swiss Constitution of 1874 guaranteed only a limited range of procedu-
ral rights (for example, the right to be sued at one’s home court). It should 
be noted that it also guaranteed a narrow range of substantive fundamental 
rights. However, over the course of the 20th century, the Swiss Federal Supreme 
Court developed many procedural guarantees, such as the right to be heard 
and other principles of effective legal protection.2 The legal basis which the 
court relied on to develop these rights was the equal protection clause.3 
Shortcomings of legal procedure at that time typically involved a deficit 
in independent judicial control. Many Swiss cantonal and federal rules only 
granted limited access to courts in administrative matters. The typical legal 
recourse involved an appeal to the hierarchically higher administrative body, 
including the Federal Council or the executive of the cantons.4 Appeals to 
the Swiss Federal Supreme Court were possible in some cases and excluded 
or reduced to a review with very limited scrutiny in others. The Swiss sys-
tem which did not permit access to independent and full judicial review in 
administrative matters was incompatible with the European Convention of 
Human Rights (ECHR) as far as its protection of “civil rights” was concerned. 
Such civil rights included matters that were considered “administrative” 
under Swiss law such as disputes concerning bar exams; the withdrawal of a 
professional licence; disputes on the use of public grounds by private parties 
for economic aims; or claims for damages and satisfaction based on state liabi-
lity. Switzerland therefore had to extend judicial control. Such developments, 
2 cؘؚ؜ءؔ K؜ؘءؘإ/Bؘإء؛ؔإؗ cüائؖ؛ؘ/Mؔا؛؜ؔئ Kب؛ء, Öffentliches Verfahrensrecht, 
2nd ƣƢiƿiƺƹ, kǀƽiơƩ/dƿ.èGƞllƣƹ ᇴᇲᇳᇷ, ƹ.èᇵᇷ.
3 f؟إ؜ؖ؛ Häؘؙ؟؜ء/Gؘآإؚ Mü؟؟ؘإ/Fؘ؟؜ث f؛؟ؠؔءء, Allgemeines Verwaltungsrecht, 
7thèƣƢiƿiƺƹ, kǀƽiơƩ/dƿ.èGƞllƣƹ ᇴᇲᇳᇸ, ƹ.èᇷᇹᇸ; BGEèᇳᇵᇶèIèᇴᇵ, ơƺƹƾiƢƣƽƞƿiƺƹèᇻ.ᇳ.
4 cؘءé c؛؜ءآت/Hؘ؜ءإ؜ؖ؛ Kآ؟؟ؘإ/C؛إ؜ئا؜ءؔ K؜ئئ/Dؔء؜ؘ؟ؔ e؛بإء؛ؘإإ/Dؘء؜ئؘ 
Bإü؛؟- Mآئؘإ, yƤƤƣƹƿliơƩƣƾ aƽƺǅƣƾƾƽƣơƩƿ, GƽǀƹƢlƞƨƣƹ ǀƹƢ BǀƹƢƣƾƽƣơƩƿƾƻƤlƣƨƣ, ᇵrd edi-
ƿiƺƹ, Bƞƾƣlèᇴᇲᇳᇶ, ƹ.èᇶᇳᇴ.
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among other factors, led to the framework of the current Swiss Constitution 
and to a reform of the Swiss judicial process.ᇷ
ᇴ. Cآءئا؜ابا؜آءؔ؟ Fإؔؠؘتآإ؞
The Swiss Constitutionᇸ dedicates three Articles to the codification of proce-
Ƣǀƽƞl ƽiƨƩƿƾ: éƽƿiơlƣƾèᇴᇻ, ᇴᇻƞ, ƞƹƢ ᇵᇲ. éƽƿiơlƣƾ ᇴᇻ ƞƹƢ ᇵᇲ Cƺƹƾƿiƿǀƿiƺƹ ơƺƹơƣƽƹ 
rights within ƞ ơƣƽƿƞiƹ ƻƽƺơƣƢǀƽƣ ƞƹƢ éƽƿiơlƣ ᇴᇻƞ Cƺƹƾƿiƿǀƿiƺƹ ƿƩƞƿ ǂƞƾ iƹƿƽƺ-
duced later on and has been in force since 1 January 2007 stipulates a right to 
(judicial) proceedings. Together, these provisions are the cornerstone of legal 
protection of due process in Switzerland. They are part of the framework of 
fundamental rights guaranteed by the Swiss Constitution. 
éƽƿiơlƣ ᇴᇻ Cƺƹƾƿiƿǀƿiƺƹ ƾƣƿƾ ƺǀƿ ƿƩƣ ƨƣƹƣƽƞl ƻƽƺơƣƢǀƽƞl ƨǀƞƽƞƹƿƣƣƾ ǂƩiơƩ 
apply in Switzerland: 
“Every person has the right to equal and fair treatment in judicial and administra-
tive proceedings and to have their case decided within a reasonable time.”
These guarantees apply in any proceedings, whether they are administra-
tive or in court, concerning civil, criminal, constitutional, or administrative 
Ƹƞƿƿƣƽƾ. éƽƿiơlƣ ᇴᇻ Cƺƹƾƿiƿǀƿiƺƹ ƞlƾƺ ƣǃƻliơiƿlǄ ƣƾƿƞƟliƾƩƣƾ ƿƩƞƿ ƿƩƣƾƣ ƻƽƺơƣ-
dural guarantees encompass fundamental rights such as the right be heard 
(II) or the right to legal aid (III). It also includes the term “fair treatment” that 
allows the courts to further develop procedural rights.
Article 30 Constitution requires that specific additional guarantees must 
be met in judicial proceedings. According to this provision, a court must be 
legally constituted, competent, independent, and impartial. Its hearings must 
be open to the public and judgements shall be made public7.
éƽƿiơlƣ ᇴᇻƞ Cƺƹƾƿiƿǀƿiƺƹ ƾƣƿƾ ƺǀƿ ƿƩƣ ơƺƹƢiƿiƺƹƾ Ƥƺƽ ƞơơƣƾƾ ƿƺ ơƺǀƽƿ: 
ᇷ c؛؜ءآت ƣƿ ƞl., ƹ.èᇶᇳᇻ; ƾƣƣ ƞlƾƺ e؛آؠؔئ F؟ؘ؜ءؘإ/é؟ؘثؔءؘؗإ M؜ئ؜ؖ/N؜ؖآ؟ؘ eöأأؘإت؜ؘء, 
Cƺƹƾƿiƿǀƿiƺƹƞl Lƞǂ iƹ dǂiƿǅƣƽlƞƹƢ, élƻƩƣƹ ƞƞƹ Ƣƣƹ cijƹ ᇴᇲᇳᇴ, ƻ.èᇳᇲᇹ.
ᇸ FƣƢƣƽƞl Cƺƹƾƿiƿǀƿiƺƹ ƺƤ ƿƩƣ dǂiƾƾ CƺƹƤƣƢƣƽƞƿiƺƹ ƺƤ ᇳᇺ éƻƽil ᇳᇻᇻᇻ, dc ᇳᇲᇳ; ƾƣƣ Ƥƺƽ ƞƹ EƹƨliƾƩ 
ǁƣƽƾiƺƹ ƺƤ ƿƩƣ Cƺƹƾƿiƿǀƿiƺƹ ǂǂǂ.ƞƢƸiƹ.ơƩ ᄬƩƿƿƻƾ://ƻƣƽƸƞ.ơơ/MᇺfJ- dᇵᇸᇻᄭ.
7 The law may restrict this guarantee and does particularly so in administrative matters. 
Hence, parties requesting hearings typically rely on Articleèᇸ ECHc.
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“In a legal dispute, every person has the right to have their case determined by a 
judicial authority. The Confederation and the Cantons may by law preclude the de-
termination by the courts of certain exceptional categories of case.” 
The term “legal dispute” must be defined by relevant procedural law and 
constitutional practice. Only the law itself may restrict access to court. The 
Constitution establishes that this may only be done in exceptional circum-
ƾƿƞƹơƣƾ. éƽƿiơlƣ ᇴᇻƞ Cƺƹƾƿiƿǀƿiƺƹ ǂƞƾ ơlƣƞƽlǄ iƹƾƻiƽƣƢ ƟǄ éƽƿiơlƣèᇳᇻèIg ƺƤ ƿƩƣ 
GƣƽƸƞƹ Grundgesetz (Rechtsweggarantie).8
The Constitution remains silent on the question of the scope of judicial 
ƽƣǁiƣǂ. éƽƿiơlƣèᇴᇻƞ Cƺƹƾƿiƿǀƿiƺƹ iƾ ƨƣƹƣƽƞllǄ ǀƹƢƣƽƾƿƺƺƢ ƞƾ ƨǀƞƽƞƹƿƣƣiƹƨ ƺƹlǄ 
a single, first instance review of the facts and of the law by a court. The right 
to appeal, especially the right to appeal to the Swiss Federal Supreme Court, 
ơƞƹƹƺƿ Ɵƣ ƢƣƢǀơƣƢ ƤƽƺƸ éƽƿiơlƣè ᇴᇻƞ Cƺƹƾƿiƿǀƿiƺƹ. Hƺǂƣǁƣƽ, ƿƩiƾ ƽiƨƩƿ iƾ 
often guaranteed by more specific provisions of the Constitution such as the 
ƽiƨƩƿ ƿƺ ƞƻƻƣƞl iƹ ƻƣƹƞl Ƹƞƿƿƣƽƾ ᄬéƽƿiơlƣèᇵᇴ Cƺƹƾƿiƿǀƿiƺƹᄭ ƺƽ ƿƩƣ ƨƣƹƣƽƞl ᄬƟǀƿ 
ƹƺƿ ǀƹiǁƣƽƾƞlᄭ ƽiƨƩƿ ƿƺ ƞơơƣƾƾ ƿƩƣ dǂiƾƾ FƣƢƣƽƞl dǀƻƽƣƸƣ Cƺǀƽƿ ᄬéƽƿiơlƣè ᇳᇻᇳ 
Constitution). It is also unequivocal that an (administrative) court may not 
review questions of administrative discretion;ᇻ this is not a matter that comes 
ǀƹƢƣƽ éƽƿiơlƣ ᇴᇻƞ Cƺƹƾƿiƿǀƿiƺƹ’ƾ ƨǀƞƽƞƹƿƣƣ ƺƤ ƞ ƽƣǁiƣǂ ƺƤ ƿƩƣ Ƥƞơƿƾ ƞƹƢ ƿƩƣ lƞǂ.
ᇵ. Fؘؘؗإؔ؟ Aؖا آء Aؗؠ؜ء؜ئاإؔا؜ةؘ aإآؘؖؗبإؘ 
ؔءؗ Cؔءاآءؔ؟ Lؔتئ
Specific regulation on administrative procedure is laid down in federal and 
cantonal legislation. The Administrative Procedure Act10 is relevant for admi-
nistrative decisions of the federal authorities. It is also relevant in part for the 
Swiss Federal Administrative Court. There are also acts on the Swiss Federal 
Administrative Court11 and the Swiss Federal Supreme Court.12 
8 éƽƿiơlƣ ᇳᇻèIg GƽǀƹƢƨƣƾƣƿǅ ƽƣƞƢƾ, iƹ iƿƾ EƹƨliƾƩ ƿƽƞƹƾlƞƿiƺƹ, ƞƾ Ƥƺllƺǂƾ: “Should any per-
son’s rights be violated by public authority, he may have recourse to the courts. If no other 
jurisdiction has been established, recourse shall be to the ordinary courts. […].”
ᇻ c؛؜ءآت ƣƿ ƞl., ƹ.èᇳᇳᇴᇲ.
10 FƣƢƣƽƞl éơƿ ƺƹ éƢƸiƹiƾƿƽƞƿiǁƣ aƽƺơƣƢǀƽƣ ƺƤ ᇴᇲ DƣơƣƸƟƣƽ ᇳᇻᇸᇺ, dcèᇳᇹᇴ.ᇲᇴᇳ.
11 FƣƢƣƽƞl éƢƸiƹiƾƿƽƞƿiǁƣ Cƺǀƽƿ éơƿ ƺƤ ᇳᇹ Jǀƹƣ ᇴᇲᇲᇷ, dcèᇳᇹᇵ.ᇵᇴ.
12 FƣƢƣƽƞl dǀƻƽƣƸƣ Cƺǀƽƿ éơƿ ƺƤ ᇳᇹ Jǀƹƣ ᇴᇲᇲᇷ, dcèᇳᇹᇵ.ᇳᇳᇲ.
224 Felix Uhlmann: Administrative Procedure
The Swiss cantons have their own codes of administrative procedure. These 
codes are applicable not only to cantonal acts based on cantonal law but also 
to cantonal acts which apply federal law (or which apply both cantonal and 
federal law). Many federal laws are implemented by the cantons (e.g. spa-
tial planning, traffic safety, migration). Although the cantons are not legally 
required to adhere to definitions in federal law such as the definition of an 
administrative act (or the consequences for legal protection that follow from 
the federal approach), there are no noticeable definitional differences of an 
administrative act in cantonal law. Hence, the definition of administrative 
acts is virtually the same in both federal and cantonal procedures. In many 
other aspects, federal and cantonal acts on administrative procedure are 
quite likewise.
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II.  aƽƺơƣƢǀƽƞl ciƨƩƿƾ ƞƹƢ 
Principles
ᇳ. Aؗؠ؜ء؜ئاإؔا؜ةؘ Aؖا؜آء
In Switzerland, legal protection from administrative action is traditionally lin-
ked to the nature of the administrative action. Administrative action carried 
out in the form of administrative decisions, also called rulings (Verfügungen, 
decisions, decisioni), typically trigger legal protection, either from the admi-
nistration or the courts, or sometimes from both.13 fƹƢƣƽ ƤƣƢƣƽƞl lƞǂ, ƞƹ 
administrative decision must be notified to the parties in writing. It “must 
state the grounds on which [it is] based and contain instructions on legal reme-
dies” ᄬéƽƿiơlƣèᇵᇷ I éƢƸiƹiƾƿƽƞƿiǁƣ aƽƺơƣƢǀƽƣ éơƿᄭ.
This leads to the question of what kind of administrative action must be clo-
thed in the form of an administrative decision. The answer is that administ-
rative decisions must be issued where the administration’s actions determine 
the rights and obligations of private individuals. This was explained in the 
chapter on Administrative Law.14 
éƽƿiơlƣè ᇷ éƢƸiƹiƾƿƽƞƿiǁƣ aƽƺơƣƢǀƽƣ éơƿ iƾ ƿƩƣ ƽƣlƣǁƞƹƿ ƻƽƺǁiƾiƺƹ Ƥƺƽ ƿƩƣ 
definition of administrative decisions. This Article also specifies that enforce-
ment measures, interim orders, decisions on objections, appeal decisions etc. 
fall under the scope of this clause. It may be that an administrative decision is 
simply declaratory, clarifying the extent, existence, or non- existence of pub-
lic law rights or obligations (e.g. confirming that a certain business practice 
is within the boundaries of the laws on environmental protection). Such a 
declaratory ruling must be issued if the applicant has an interest that is 
worthy of protection.ᇳᇷ
The link between administrative decisions and legal protection for indivi-
Ƣǀƞlƾ illǀƾƿƽƞƿƣƾ ǂƩǄ ƻƽiǁƞƿƣ ƻƞƽƿiƣƾ ƞƽƣ lƺƺkiƹƨ Ƥƺƽèᅬ ƺƽ iƹ ƿƩƣ ǂƺƽƢƾ ƺƤ ƺƹƣ 
13 K؜ؘءؘإ/cüائؖ؛ؘ/Kب؛ء, ƹ.èᇳᇴᇶᇷ; ƾƣƣ F؟ؘ؜ءؘإ/M؜ئ؜ؖ/eöأأؘإت؜ؘء, ƻ.èᇴᇺᇶ.
14 See pp. 204.
ᇳᇷ dƣƣ éƽƿiơlƣèᇴᇷèII éƢƸiƹiƾƿƽƞƿiǁƣ aƽƺơƣƢǀƽƣ éơƿ.
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scholar, “hunting for”ᇳᇸè ᅬ ƿƩiƾ ƾƻƣơiƤiơ ƤƺƽƸ ƺƤ ƞƢƸiƹiƾƿƽƞƿiǁƣ ƞơƿiƺƹ. OƿƩƣƽ 
types of state action not clothed in the form administrative decisions are real 
acts (Realakte, actes matériels, atti materiali). They encompass acts such as 
teaching in schools, treatments in hospitals, police action, public informa-
tion etc. Legal protection against such acts was traditionally weak. People 
could rely on state liability claims but this presented disadvantages.17 Thus, 
ƿƩƣ ƤƣƢƣƽƞl lƣƨiƾlƞƿƺƽ iƹƿƽƺƢǀơƣƢ éƽƿiơlƣè ᇴᇷƞ éƢƸiƹiƾƿƽƞƿiǁƣ aƽƺơƣƢǀƽƣ éơƿ 
in order to improve legal protection: this provision establishes that everyone 
with an “interest worthy of protection”18 may require that an administrative 
decision is taken on real acts.
eƩƣ dǂiƾƾ ơƞƹƿƺƹƾ ƞƽƣ ƹƺƿ ƟƺǀƹƢ ƟǄ ƿƩƣ ƹƣǂ éƽƿiơlƣ ᇴᇷƞ éƢƸiƹiƾƿƽƞƿiǁƣ 
Procedure Act within their own domain. In practice, cantons have taken a 
variety of responses to the introduction of this Article. In some cases, they 
have copied the provision; in others they have either opted to enact their own 
independent solutions (such as allowing for a direct appeal against real acts) 
or made no change at all. It is disputed whether the latter is still permissible 
ǀƹƢƣƽ éƽƿiơlƣèᇴᇻƞ Cƺƹƾƿiƿǀƿiƺƹ: ƿƩiƾ ƻƽƺǁiƾiƺƹ ƨǀƞƽƞƹƿƣƣƾ jǀƢiơiƞl ƻƽƺƿƣơƿiƺƹ 
in any legal dispute and arguably, in those cantons which have still intro-
duced no change, there is currently only limited legal protection available 
against real acts. The Swiss Federal Supreme Court has not yet made a ruling 
on this issue.
ᇴ. c؜ؚ؛ا اآ ؘؕ Hؘؔإؗ
As explained above, when administrative bodies act through an administra-
tive decision, a number of procedural rights are triggered.ᇳᇻ The most import-
ant guarantee is the right to be heard.20 It applies in administrative and court 
proceedings.
ᇳᇸ dؘإؚ؜آ G؜ؔؖآؠ؜ء؜, gƺƸ „JƞƨƢƸƞơƩƣƹ ƞǀƤ Ƣiƣ gƣƽƤüƨǀƹƨ“è ᅬ Eiƹ DiƾkǀƾƾiƺƹƾƟƣiƿƽƞƨ, 
dơƩǂƣiǅƣƽiƾơƩƣƾ kƣƹƿƽƞlƟlƞƿƿ Ƥüƽ dƿƞƞƿƾ- ǀƹƢ gƣƽǂƞlƿǀƹƨƾƽƣơƩƿ ᇳᇻᇻᇵ, ƻ.èᇴᇵᇹ, ƻ. ᇴᇵᇻ.
17 f؛؟ؠؔءء, ƻ.èᇵᇲᇹ.
18 dƣƣ BGEèᇳᇴᇳèIèᇺᇹ, ơƺƹƾiƢƣƽƞƿiƺƹèᇳƟ.
ᇳᇻ For simplicity, the following quotations only contain constitutional federal law. The 
legal situation in the cantons is very similar, partly because of the compulsory nature of 
constitutional law, partly because of the example set out by federal law.
20 F؟ؘ؜ءؘإ/M؜ئ؜ؖ/eöأأؘإت؜ؘء, ƻ.èᇴᇷᇷ. 
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The right to be heard encompasses the right to access relevant documents, 
the possibility to propose witnesses and other means of evidence, and the 
right to be informed of the possible administrative decision beforehand etc. As 
mentioned before, the right to be heard is granted by the Swiss Constitution. 
Procedural law and court practice further concretize the right in specific situ-
ations, as well as providing for restrictions on the right in cases which involve 
relevant third party interests (e.g. business secrets) or state interests (e.g. state 
security). The imposition of such restrictions often necessitates the striking of 
a fair balance between differing interests. If a restriction is necessary, courts 
will try to summarize the content of the document for the relevant party in 
order to allow a fair discussion on the relevant facts of the case. The court 
iƿƾƣlƤ ǀƾǀƞllǄ Ʃƞƾ ƞơơƣƾƾ ƿƺ ƞll ƢƺơǀƸƣƹƿƾèᅬ ơƞƾƣƾ ǂƩƣƽƣ ƢƺơǀƸƣƹƿƾ Ʃƞǁƣ ƹƺƿ 
been released to the courts are extremely rare.21
Although access to documents is probably the most important aspect of the 
right to be heard, it should be noted that the scope of this right goes much 
further. The right may also be violated if relevant evidence is rejected by the 
court, for example the refusal to hear witnesses (although note that witness 
hearings are relatively rare in administrative cases) or the refusal to admit 
expert evidence. The court must also effectively take the private parties’ 
arguments into account. If a decision has already been taken before conside-
ring the parties’ arguments, the right to be heard is clearly violated. Further, 
only when the authorities give oral or written reasons for their decisions can 
the person concerned determine whether his or her argument has been heard 
or taken into account. In the authority’s decision, it must also deal with the 
private parties’ arguments, although this may be done briefly. The reason for 
the decision must also be sufficiently clear in order to allow an appeal. 
The right to be heard also demands that the administrative process is suf-
ficiently transparent. The authority must make it very clear when it is acting 
through the form of an administrative act. This means that the private par-
ties know when the process has ended; and if no administrative act has been 
issued they will also know that the process is still ongoing. This obligation 
goes hand in hand with the duty of the authority to be transparent about the 
21 A notorious example involved constructions plans on nuclear weapons that the Federal 
Council, i.e. the federal government, ordered to be destroyed during ongoing criminal 
proceedings; see the investigation of the Swiss Parliament (Fall Tinner, Rechtmässigkeit 
Ƣƣƽ BƣƾơƩlüƾƾƣ Ƣƣƾ BǀƹƢƣƾƽƞƿƾ ǀƹƢ kǂƣơkƸäƾƾiƨkƣiƿ ƾƣiƹƣƽ FüƩƽǀƹƨ, BƣƽiơƩƿ Ƣƣƽ 
GƣƾơƩäƤƿƾƻƽüƤǀƹƨƾƢƣlƣƨƞƿiƺƹ Ƣƣƽ EiƢƨƣƹöƾƾiƾơƩƣƹ cäƿƣ ǁƺƸ ᇳᇻ.è Jƞƹǀƞƽ ᇴᇲᇲᇻ [FƣƢƣƽƞl 
Gƞǅƣƿƿƣ Nƺ ᇴᇹ ƺƤ ᇳᇻ JƞƹǀƞƽǄ ᇴᇲᇲᇻ, ƻ. ᇷᇲᇲᇹ]ᄭ.
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process and the possible measures it intends to use. The authority is not per-
mitted to be unduly vague about its actions nor may it “surprise” the private 
parties with the procedure it follows. The latter point is illustrated by a recent 
decision of the Swiss Federal Supreme Court: The local authorities had invited 
individuals who had applied to be naturalised to an informal “get- to- know” 
session. They had not made it clear that they planned to test the applicants 
on their knowledge of Swiss culture, history, and more at this meeting. The 
Federal Supreme Court considered that although it is acceptable to expect 
naturalization applicants to have a basic knowledge of Switzerland, it is not 
acceptable to test that knowledge without first giving them proper notice.22 
This case also shows that the right to be heard is a flexible instrument that the 
courts can utilise to intervene against any form of administrative process that 
does not appear fair.
ᇵ. c؜ؚ؛ا اآ ؔ Dؘؖ؜ئ؜آء h؜ا؛؜ء cؘؔئآءؔؕ؟ؘ e؜ؠؘ
A fair process also includes the right to have a decision taken within a reason-
ƞƟlƣ ƿiƸƣ ᄬéƽƿiơlƣèᇴᇻ Cƺƹƾƿiƿǀƿiƺƹᄭ. IƤ ƿƩƣ ƞǀƿƩƺƽiƿǄ Ƣƺƣƾ ƹƺƿ ƞơƿ ǂiƿƩiƹ ƞ ƽƣƞ-
sonable time, an appeal may be filed at any point. The reasonableness must 
be determined in light of all circumstances of the case. The authority may 
consider the complexity of the case, the urgency of the matter, and the beha-
viour of the parties. However, any internal issues of the relevant authority, i.e. 
shortage of personell, are certainly not valid grounds for delay.
ᇶ. c؜ؚ؛ا اآ Lؘؚؔ؟ A؜ؗ ؔءؗ اآ Cآبءئؘ؟
A last important aspect of the overall fairness of the procedure is the right 
to legal aid.23 The right to legal aid and to the assistance of a legal counsel if 
ƹƣơƣƾƾƞƽǄ iƾ ơlƣƞƽlǄ ƨǀƞƽƞƹƿƣƣƢ ƟǄ éƽƿiơlƣèᇴᇻ III Cƺƹƾƿiƿǀƿiƺƹ: 
“Any person who does not have sufficient means has the right to free legal advice 
and assistance unless their case appears to have no prospect of success. If it is 
22 BGE ᇳᇶᇲ I ᇻᇻ, ơƺƹƾiƢƣƽƞƿiƺƹƾ ᇴ ƞƹƢ ᇵ.
23 F؟ؘ؜ءؘإ/M؜ئ؜ؖ/eöأأؘإت؜ؘء, ƻ.èᇴᇷᇸ.
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necessary in order to safeguard their rights, they also have the right to free legal 
representation.” 
The aid can only be granted if a reasonable person would consider the case 
to have a sufficient chance of success. The need for legal counsel depends 
on the complexity of the matter and the abilities of the private party: if that 
person may represent him or herself without great difficulties before the rele-
vant authority, the request for free legal representation will be denied. If the 
parties are covering the costs of legal representation themselves, it is possible 
to be represented. However, there is no obligation to employ a lawyer or ano-
ƿƩƣƽ ƾƻƣơiƞliƾƿ. GƣƹƣƽƞllǄ, ƿƩƣƽƣ ƞƽƣ ƹƺ ƻƽƺơƣƢǀƽƣƾ iƹ dǂiƾƾ ƞƢƸiƹiƾƿƽƞƿiǁƣ 
law in which legal representation is compulsory. There are very few excep-
tions, where the respective authority may order that the parties must appoint 
ƺƹƣ ƺƽ Ƹƺƽƣ ƽƣƻƽƣƾƣƹƿƞƿiǁƣƾ ᄬƣ.ƨ. éƽƿiơlƣèᇳᇳƞ éƢƸiƹiƾƿƽƞƿiǁƣ aƽƺơƣƢǀƽƣ éơƿᄭ. 
In cases involving administrative and constitutional law, parties may (even 
before the Swiss Federal Supreme Court) be represented by anybody with 
ơƞƻƞơiƿǄ ƿƺèƞơƿ.
ᇷ. c؜ؚ؛ا اآ Aأأؘؔ؟
As previously discussed,24 the form of an administrative decision implies 
that there is a legal remedy available against that decision. The administ-
rative decision must contain instructions on the available legal remedies. 
DƣƻƣƹƢiƹƨ ƺƹ ƿƩƣ ƽƣlƣǁƞƹƿ ƞƢƸiƹiƾƿƽƞƿiǁƣ ƻƽƺơƣƢǀƽƣ, ƿƩƣ ƞƻƻƣƞl ƸƞǄ ƨƺ 
directly to a court or instead first to a higher administrative authority and 
then to a court. Exceptions from legal recourse must be clearly stated in the 
law and are restricted to exceptional cases. In practice, these exceptions con-
cern highly political matters, for example the issuing of a permit to build a 
ƹǀơlƣƞƽ ƻƺǂƣƽ ƾƿƞƿiƺƹ ƺƽ Ƹƞƿƿƣƽƾ ƺƤ ƹƞƿiƺƹƞl ƾƣơǀƽiƿǄ ᄬéƽƿiơlƣèᇵᇴ I liƿ. ƞ ƞƹƢ ƣ 
Administrative Court Act). Some other exceptions concern technical matters 
or matters that seem little suited for court decisions such as financial bonuses 
Ƥƺƽ ơiǁil ƾƣƽǁƞƹƿƾ ᄬéƽƿiơlƣè ᇵᇴ I liƿ.è ơ éƢƸiƹiƾƿƽƞƿiǁƣ Cƺǀƽƿ éơƿᄭ. Oǁƣƽƞll, ƿƩƣ 
exceptions are narrowly circumscribed by the legislator, as demanded by the 
Swiss Constitution. 
24 See pp. ᇴᇴᇷ.
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Matters are more complicated if third parties intervene. Whether they 
are granted a right to appeal largely depends on the way the term “party” is 
defined. Any party to the procedure may launch an appeal (and has the right to 
participate in the proceedings from the very beginning). The Administrative 
Procedure Act defines parties, i.e. the holders of the procedural rights, in 
terms of their material interest in participating: “Parties are persons whose 
rights or obligations are intended to be affected by the ruling.”ᇴᇷ A similar wor-
ding is used for the definition of locus standi in an appeal. The right to appeal 
is granted to anyone that is “specifically affected by the contested ruling” and 
“has an interest that is worthy of protection in the revocation or amendment of 
the ruling” ᄬéƽƿiơlƣèᇶᇺ I éƢƸiƹiƾƿƽƞƿiǁƣ aƽƺơƣƢǀƽƣ éơƿᄭ. aƞƽƿiơiƻƞƿiƺƹ iƹ ƿƩƣ 
first- instance proceedings is generally a requirement for a party to possess 
the legal standing to lodge an appeal. Typical third parties are neighbours 
ƞƹƢèᅬ Ƹƺƽƣ ƽƣƾƿƽiơƿƣƢèᅬ ơƺƸƻƣƿiƿƺƽƾ.
ᇸ. c؜ؚ؛ا اآ C؛ؔ؟؟ؘءؘؚ Lؘؚ؜ئ؟ؔا؜آء
Most legislation can be challenged in a concrete case before a court (or before 
an administrative body). A court will then proceed to conduct a two- tier 
review. First, it will examine whether the normative basis is legal (vorfra-
geweise, inzidente, konkrete Normenkontrolle). If this test is met, the court 
further examines whether the law was applied correctly.ᇴᇸ
éƽƿiơlƣèᇳᇻᇲ Cƺƹƾƿiƿǀƿiƺƹ ƹƺƿiơƣƞƟlǄ ƻƽƣǁƣƹƿƾ jǀƢiơiƞl ƽƣǁiƣǂ ƺƤ lƣƨiƾlƞƿiƺƹ, 
requiring that federal laws be applied even in the case that the court finds the 
law unconstitutional.
A direct challenge of legislation (abstrakte, direkte Normenkontrolle) is pos-
sible where cantonal laws and ordinances are at issue. The latter includes inter-
nal normative acts (Verwaltungsverordnungen) if these affect private parties 
and their review proves to be impossible or impractical in a concrete case.27 
The cases that challenge cantonal laws are typically decided directly by the 
Swiss Federal Supreme Court if there is no legal remedy at the cantonal level. 
The Swiss Federal Supreme Court may quash cantonal laws, thus rendering 
them fully or partially invalid. Even if the court does not invalidate cantonal 
ᇴᇷ Articleèᇸ Administrative Procedure Act also states that “other persons, organizations or 
authorities who have a legal remedy against the ruling” are parties.
ᇴᇸ c؛؜ءآت ƣƿ ƞl., ƹ.èᇹᇲᇹ ƣƿ ƾƣƼ.
27 BGE ᇳᇴᇺ I ᇳᇸᇹ, ơƺƹƾiƢƣƽƞƿiƺƹ ᇶ.ᇵ; BGEèᇳᇴᇴèIèᇶᇶ, ơƺƹƾiƢƣƽƞƿiƺƹèᇴƞ. 
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legislation, it may give important guidelines for the cantonal authorities how 
to apply the law in order to stay within the constitutional boundaries. This 
was e.g. the case for police legislation from Zurich. Cantonal constitutions 
are not subjet to judicial control as they must be approved in a procedure by 
ƿƩƣ dǂiƾƾ aƞƽliƞƸƣƹƿ ᄬéƽƿiơlƣèᇷᇳ II ƞƹƢ ᇳᇹᇴ II Cƺƹƾƿiƿǀƿiƺƹᄭ.28 There is no direct 
challenge against federal laws and ordinances.
The legal standing for challenging cantonal legislation exists in a far broa-
der manner than in cases concerning administrative decisions. A person may 
ơƩƞllƣƹƨƣ lƣƨiƾlƞƿiƺƹ iƤ ƾƩƣ ƺƽ Ʃƣ ơƞƹ ơlƞiƸ ƿƩƞƿ ƿƩƣƽƣ iƾ ƞ ƻƺƾƾiƟiliƿǄèᅬ ƣǁƣƹ iƤ ƞ 
ƽƣƸƺƿƣ ƺƹƣèᅬ ƿƩƞƿ ƾƩƣ ƺƽ Ʃƣ ǂill Ɵƣ ƞƤƤƣơƿƣƢ ƟǄ ƿƩƣ ƞơƿ ᄬvirtuelles Betroffensein).ᇴᇻ 
An appeal against legislation itself does not preclude an individual from later 
invoking a legal remedy against an individual administrative decision, which 
applies the law. In this respect, a cantonal law may be challenged twice: first 
in abstract terms regarding how the act could be applied and later regarding 
how the act was actually applied in a concrete case.
28 K؜ؘءؘإ/cüائؖ؛ؘ/Kب؛ء, ƹ.èᇳᇹᇺᇲ.
ᇴᇻ K؜ؘءؘإ/cüائؖ؛ؘ/Kب؛ء, ƹ.èᇳᇹᇶᇲ. 
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III. Iƹƾƿiƿǀƿiƺƹƞl FƽƞƸƣǂƺƽk
ᇳ. Aؗؠ؜ء؜ئاإؔا؜ةؘ Aبا؛آإ؜ا؜ؘئ
The administrative authorities themselves play a vital role in providing effec-
tive legal protection in administrative law. As was briefly explained above,30 
before the introduction of the current Swiss Constitution often only hierarchi-
cally higher administrative bodies were competent to grant legal protection 
against action taken by bodies lower in rank. This was problematic regarding 
the fact that these superior bodies were not institutionally independent. 
However, it is important not to underestimate the level of protection these 
bodies offered. First, these bodies, often affiliated with the office of Justice of 
the canton or at the very least staffed with qualified lawyers, developed high 
standards of judicial protection. Secondly, the superior administrative bodies 
are usually well aware of the daily work of the lower units, hence strengt-
hening administrative oversight. Finally, administrative control within the 
public administration has the practical advantage of allowing full scrutiny: 
whereas courts typically do not review questions of administrative discre-
tion, supervisory administrative bodies show less if any restraint.31 
The Swiss cantons also execute a substantial amount of federal law: the 
typical legal recourse against such action first involves going to the hierar-
chically higher administrative bodies. This can potentially encompass up to 
three instances, including a review by the cantonal executive.32 Following this, 
the applicant may turn to the cantonal administrative courts. These courts 
Ƹǀƾƿ ǀƻƩƺlƢ éƽƿiơlƣè ᇴᇻƞ Cƺƹƾƿiƿǀƿiƺƹ Ƹƣƞƹiƹƨ ƿƩƞƿ ƿƩƣǄ Ƹǀƾƿ ƞƿ lƣƞƾƿ ơƺƹ-
duct a full review of questions of law and facts. After a review by the cantonal 
administrative courts, most cases can be taken to the Swiss Federal Supreme 
Court (Bundesgericht, Tribunal fédéral, Tribunale federale). The Swiss Federal 
Supreme Court typically only reviews questions of law.33
30 See pp. 221.
31 K؜ؘءؘإ/cüائؖ؛ؘ/Kب؛ء, ƹ.èᇳᇵ.
32 K؜ؘءؘإ/cüائؖ؛ؘ/Kب؛ء, ƹ.èᇶᇴ.
33 See the grounds for appeal in Articlesèᇻᇷ ƣƿ ƾƣƼ. Federal Supreme Court Act. 
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Administrative acts of the federal administration can be taken to the 
Swiss Federal Administrative Court (Bundesverwaltungsgericht, Tribunal 
administratif fédéral, Tribunale administrativo federale). Judicial control by 
a higher administrative body is the exception rather than the rule for action 
taken in the federal system. However, it does have some practical signifi-
cance in areas that are excluded from judicial protection such as measures 
to safeguard internal security; in these cases, control may be partly exer-
cised by the Swiss Federal Council. According to existing legislation, the 
Federal Administrative Court reviews questions of law, facts, and adminis-
trative discretion. However, judicial practice over time has led to the courts 
typically exercising some restraint in the latter area; part of the rationale 
here is that cases involving administrative discretion often require specia-
lised technical understanding, or knowledge of the local circumstances or 
subjective factors (for example, this may be the case for administrative deci-
sions regarding exams).34 As a general rule, decisions of the Swiss Federal 
Administrative Court may be challenged before the Swiss Federal Supreme 
Court. However, some subject matter areas such as cases on immigration and 
asylum, exams, and subsidies are fully or partially excluded from Federal 
dǀƻƽƣƸƣ Cƺǀƽƿ ƽƣǁiƣǂ ᄬéƽƿiơlƣèᇺᇵ liƿ.è ơ ƞƹƢ ƿ FƣƢƣƽƞl dǀƻƽƣƸƣ Cƺǀƽƿ éơƿᄭ, 
hence rendering the Federal Administrative Court the court of last national 
instance.
ᇴ. Cآبإائ
As highlighted above, judicial control by the courts is a constitutional guaran-
ƿƣƣ ǀƹƢƣƽ éƽƿiơlƣ ᇴᇻƞ Cƺƹƾƿiƿǀƿiƺƹ. Hƣƹơƣ, Ƹƺƾƿ ƞƢƸiƹiƾƿƽƞƿiǁƣ ƞơƿƾ ƸƞǄ Ɵƣ 
challenged before an administrative court directly (like the acts of the federal 
administration) or indirectly via recourse to higher administrative bodies (e.g. 
acts of the cantonal administration).ᇵᇷ The law may only “preclude the deter-
mination by the courts of certain exceptional categories of case” ᄬéƽƿiơlƣè ᇴᇻƞ 
Constitution). 
The most important restriction on judicial control in Switzerland is not one 
ƺƤ ƿƩƣ ƻƽƣǁiƺǀƾlǄ ƺǀƿliƹƣƢ ƣǃơƣƻƿiƺƹƾ; iƿ iƾ éƽƿiơlƣèᇳᇻᇲ Cƺƹƾƿiƿǀƿiƺƹ. éơơƺƽƢiƹƨ 
to that provision, the “Federal Supreme Court and the other judicial authorities 
apply the federal acts and international law”. As a consequence of this provi-
sion, the constitutional review of federal laws is not permitted, or more 
34 Häؘؙ؟؜ء/Mü؟؟ؘإ/f؛؟ؠؔءء, ƹ.èᇶᇶᇶ.
ᇵᇷ See, for an overview, F؟ؘ؜ءؘإ/M؜ئ؜ؖ/eöأأؘإت؜ؘء, ƻ.èᇳᇳᇲ.
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Figure 1: Appeal System before Cantonal (State) and Federal Authoritiesᇵᇸ
precisely, Swiss courts must apply federal laws even if they are considered 
to be unconstitutional.37 Judicial practice has carved out some exceptions to 
court abstinence, such as in the case of federal laws, which violate the ECHR. 
The Swiss Federal Supreme Court will not apply a federal law in conflict with 
the ECHR. Still, a substantial part of federal legislation is not subject to court 
nullification in the case of a violation of the Constitution. Swiss cantons, e.g., 
cannot sue the federal government for overstepping its competences if federal 
action is based on federal law.
eƩƣ ƽƞƿiƺƹƞlƣ ƟƣƩiƹƢ éƽƿiơlƣèᇳᇻᇲ Cƺƹƾƿiƿǀƿiƺƹ iƾ ƿƩƞƿ ƿƩƣ lƞƾƿ ǂƺƽƢ ƺƹ Ƽǀƣƾ-
tions of constitutionality should not be given to a court but to the legislator 
itself, as this is the authority with the highest degree of democratic legitima-
tion. The federal legislator is not above the Constitution but above constituti-
onal control; it is officially bound by the Constitution and must respect it. This 
means that the federal Parliament itself must decide upon questions of the 
ơƺƹƾƿiƿǀƿiƺƹƞliƿǄ ƺƤ ƤƣƢƣƽƞl lƞǂƾèᅬ ǂƩiơƩ iƿ ƽƣƨǀlƞƽlǄ Ƣƺƣƾ, ƾǀƻƻƺƽƿƣƢ ƟǄ ƿƩƣ 
ᇵᇸ f؛؟ؠؔءء, ƻ.èᇵᇳᇵ.
37 K؜ؘءؘإ/cüائؖ؛ؘ/Kب؛ء, ƹ.èᇳᇹᇸᇵ.
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ƣǃƻƣƽƿ ƺƻiƹiƺƹ ƺƤ ƿƩƣ FƣƢƣƽƞl DƣƻƞƽƿƸƣƹƿ ƺƤ Jǀƾƿiơƣ. dƣǁƣƽƞl ƞƿƿƣƸƻƿƾ ƟǄ ƿƩƣ 
dǂiƾƾ ƨƺǁƣƽƹƸƣƹƿ ƿƺ ƞƟƺliƾƩ éƽƿiơlƣèᇳᇻᇲ Cƺƹƾƿiƿǀƿiƺƹ Ʃƞǁƣ ƤƞilƣƢ; aƞƽliƞƸƣƹƿ 
has thus far refused to allow a shift in power to the courts, which in my view 
is regrettable.
NƺƿƞƟlǄ, dǂiƿǅƣƽlƞƹƢ Ƣƺƣƾ ƹƺƿ Ʃƞǁƣ ƞ ƾƻƣơiƞl ơƺƹƾƿiƿǀƿiƺƹƞl ơƺǀƽƿ. IƹƾƿƣƞƢ, 
constitutional questions may be decided by every Swiss court including 
cantonal courts and courts that decide upon civil or penal matters. In con-
crete cases, constitutional questions may even be decided by administrative 
bodies. Hence, Switzerland has opted for a so- called “diffuse” system of con-
stitutional review,38 ơlƺƾƣƽ ƿƺ ƿƩƣ fd ơƺǀƽƿ ƾǄƾƿƣƸ ƿƩƞƹ ƿƺ ƿƩƣ GƣƽƸƞƹ ƸƺƢƣl 
of concentrated constitutional review.
According to the Administrative Procedure Act, “[t]he appellate authority 
shall itself make the decision in the case or in exceptional cases shall refer the 
case back to the lower instance and issue binding instructions” ᄬéƽƿiơlƣè ᇸᇳ I 
Administrative Procedure Act). A referral back to the lower instance admi-
nistrative authority is typically made if further fact- finding has to be done 
by the lower instance or if the lower instance may use its discretion to decide 
the case.ᇵᇻ 
BƺƿƩ ƞƻƻƣllƞƿƣ ƞƢƸiƹiƾƿƽƞƿiǁƣ ƞǀƿƩƺƽiƿiƣƾ ƞƹƢ ƿƩƣ ơƺǀƽƿƾ ƸƞǄ ƨƽƞƹƿ iƹƿƣ-
rim relief. Typically, an appeal automatically has suspensive effect.40 As the 
Administrative Procedure Act declares, a court may also take “other precau-
tionary measures […] to preserve the current situation or to temporarily safegu-
ard interests that are at risk” ᄬéƽƿiơlƣ ᇷᇸ éƢƸiƹiƾƿƽƞƿiǁƣ aƽƺơƣƢǀƽƣ éơƿᄭ. dǂiƾƾ 
courts typically approach the question of whether to grant suspensive effect 
or precautionary measures by conducting a balancing test between the inte-
rests of the state and those of private parties. If they believe that the even-
tual result of the case is clear, they also may take the probable outcome into 
account in considering the granting of such measures.41 Such decisions are 
often of great practical importance: cases on public procurement often do not 
continue once the public authority has legally concluded the contract with its 
chosen private partner; if the suspensive effect is denied, the claimants may 
only recover their costs from the procedure but not conclude the contract.
38 K؜ؘءؘإ/cüائؖ؛ؘ/Kب؛ء, ƹ.èᇳᇹᇳᇻ.
ᇵᇻ K؜ؘءؘإ/cüائؖ؛ؘ/Kب؛ء, ƹ.èᇳᇸᇶᇻ ƣƿ ƾƣƼ.
40 For details see c؛؜ءآت ƣƿ ƞl., ƹ.èᇸᇺᇲ ƣƿ ƾƣƼ.
41 K؜ؘءؘإ/cüائؖ؛ؘ/Kب؛ء, ƹ.èᇳᇵᇵᇲ.
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ᇵ. Oا؛ؘإ Bآؗ؜ؘئ ؔءؗ aإآؘؖؗبإؘئ
In the federal system, special committees which serve as courts have been 
abolished, with the exception of the Independent Complaints Authority for 
Radio and Television. The committees have been replaced by the Federal 
Administrative Court which is competent in all matters decided by the federal 
administration.42 In the cantons, special committees still exist, most notably 
in the areas of construction, taxes and culture.43
In some cantons, the institution of the Ombudsman has some practical sig-
nificance.44 On the federal level, an initiative to introduce the Ombudsman 
failed. There are however two independent, personalised functions of con-
trol of state- regulated prices (Eidgenössischer Preisüberwacher) and of data 
protection and transparency of the public administration (Eidgenössischer 
Datenschutz- und Öffentlichkeitsbeauftragter, EDÖBᄭ. BƺƿƩ ƸƞǄ ƽƣƾƺƽƿ ƿƺ 
the use of legal remedies but the most efficient tools available to them are 
negotiation with the administration and informing the public on its rights. 
eƩƣ “EDyB” ƸƞǄ ƞlƾƺ iƹiƿiƞƿƣ lƣƨƞl ƻƽƺơƣƣƢiƹƨƾ ƞƨƞiƹƾƿ ƻƽiǁƞƿƣ ƻƞƽƿiƣƾ; Ʃƣ Ʃƞƾ 
Ƣƺƹƣ ƾƺ iƹ ƞƹ iƸƻƺƽƿƞƹƿ ơƞƾƣ ƞƨƞiƹƾƿ Gƺƺƨlƣ ᄬƨƺƺƨlƣ ƾƿƽƣƣƿ ǁiƣǂᄭᇶᇷ.
Another route through which parties can challenge administrative action 
iƾ élƿƣƽƹƞƿiǁƣ Diƾƻǀƿƣ cƣƾƺlǀƿiƺƹ ᄬéDcᄭ, ƽƣơƣƹƿlǄ iƹƿƽƺƢǀơƣƢ iƹƿƺ ƿƩƣ 
éƢƸiƹiƾƿƽƞƿiǁƣ aƽƺơƣƢǀƽƣ éơƿ. éƽƿiơlƣè ᇵᇵƟ I éƢƸiƹiƾƿƽƞƿiǁƣ aƽƺơƣƢǀƽƣ éơƿ 
establishes that the court “may suspend the proceedings with the consent of the 
parties in order that the parties may agree on the content of the ruling”. It may 
encourage the parties to reach an agreement by appointing a neutral media-
tor. The provision has not been in force long enough to make any useful com-
ment on its practical consequences.
ᇶ. Eبإآأؘؔء aؘإئأؘؖا؜ةؘ 
éƾ dǂiƿǅƣƽlƞƹƢ iƾ ƹƺƿ ƞ ƸƣƸƟƣƽ ƺƤ ƿƩƣ Ef, Ef lƞǂ iƾ ƹƺƿ ƢiƽƣơƿlǄ ƞƻƻliơƞƟlƣ 
in Switzerland. However, it may be relevant due to the bilateral treaties or 
Ƣǀƣ ƿƺ ƞƹ ƞǀƿƺƹƺƸƺǀƾ Ƣƣơiƾiƺƹ ƟǄ ƿƩƣ dǂiƾƾ ƞǀƿƩƺƽiƿiƣƾ ƿƺ iƸƻlƣƸƣƹƿ Ef lƞǂ 
42 c؛؜ءآت et al., ƹ.èᇹᇺᇹ ƣƿ ƾƣƼ. ƞƹƢ ᇳᇶᇳᇸ.
43 K؜ؘءؘإ/cüائؖ؛ؘ/Kب؛ء, ƹ.èᇳᇶᇲᇴ.
44 Häؘؙ؟؜ء/Mü؟؟ؘإ/f؛؟ؠؔءء, ƹ.èᇳᇹᇸᇺ ƣƿ ƾƣƼ.
ᇶᇷ BGE ᇳᇵᇺ II ᇵᇶᇸ. 
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(autonomer Nachvollzug).ᇶᇸ Ef lƞǂ iƾ lƞƽƨƣlǄ iƽƽƣlƣǁƞƹƿ iƹ ƿƣƽƸƾ ƺƤ ƿƩƣ ƾǀƟƾ-
tantive legal protection available in Switzerland; the procedure is predomi-
nantly dictated by domestic Swiss law.
Switzerland is currently in the process of negotiating an institutional agree-
ment to ensure the more consistent and efficient application of its present 
ƞƹƢ Ƥǀƿǀƽƣ ƞƨƽƣƣƸƣƹƿƾ ǂiƿƩ ƿƩƣ Ef. IƤ dǂiƿǅƣƽlƞƹƢ ơƞƹ ơƺƹơlǀƢƣ ƾǀơƩ ƞƹ iƹƾ-
ƿiƿǀƿiƺƹƞl ƞƨƽƣƣƸƣƹƿ ǂiƿƩ ƿƩƣ Ef, Ƽǀƣƾƿiƺƹƾ ƺƤ jǀƽiƾƢiơƿiƺƹ ǂƺǀlƢ Ɵƣ ƞ ơƺƽƣ 
element. An agreement would clearly influence the administrative process in 
Ƹƞƿƿƣƽƾ iƹǁƺlǁiƹƨ Ef lƞǂ. Hƺǂƣǁƣƽ, ƹƣƨƺƿiƞƿiƺƹƾ Ƣƺ ƹƺƿ ƞƻƻƣƞƽ likƣlǄ ƿƺ ơƺƸƣ 
to a successful end any time soon.
In contrast, the legal protection now available in administrative matters 
has certainly been influenced by the jurisprudence of the European Court of 
Human Rights, namely to grant court review in administrative matters. As 
explained above, it was deemed insufficient for protection from the adminis-
tration to only encompass “civil matters”; it is necessary for such protection 
to also apply to areas technically falling under Swiss administrative law. The 
European Court of Human Rights is still influencing administrative proce-
dure in Switzerland, recently for example in cases, which concern the right 
to reply. The Swiss Federal Supreme Court has now shaped a practice that 
seems to be consistent with European Court of Human Rights requirements: 
all documents submitted in court procedures must be forwarded to the par-
ties.47 In administrative procedures this requirement extends to all relevant 
documents submitted to authorities and courts.
ᇶᇸ dƣƣ ƿƩƣ ơƩƞƻƿƣƽ ƺƹ Iƹƿƣƽƹƞƿiƺƹƞl cƣlƞƿiƺƹƾ, ƻƻ. ᇳᇸᇷ.
47 dƣƣ BGE ᇳᇵᇹ I ᇳᇻᇷ.
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Ig. LƞƹƢƸƞƽk Cƞƾƣƾ
ᇳ. Nؘؘؖئئ؜اج آؙ Iئئب؜ءؚ ؔء Aؗؠ؜ء؜ئاإؔا؜ةؘ  
Dؘؖ؜ئ؜آء: IhB 48
i ǂƞƾ ƞ ƿƣƹƞƹƿ iƹ ƞ Bƞƾƣl ƻƽƺƻƣƽƿǄ. Fƺƽ ƿǂƺ Ǆƣƞƽƾ, iƿƾ ƺǂƹƣƽ Ʃƞƾ ƹƺƿ ƻƞiƢ ƿƩƣ 
bills for the general electricity supply of the building issued by the canton 
ƺƤ Bƞƾƣl- dƿƞƢƿ iƹƢǀƾƿƽiƞl ǂƺƽkƾ ᄬIndustrielle Werke des Kantons Basel- Stadt, 
IhBᄭ. Iƹ ƞ lƣƿƿƣƽ ƺƤ ƤƺƽƸƞl ƹƺƿiơƣ ƿƺ ƿƩƣ ƺǂƹƣƽ, IhB ƞƹƹƺǀƹơƣƢ ƿƩƞƿ iƿ ǂƺǀlƢ 
stop electricity supply should the outstanding amount not be paid in a cer-
tain period of notice. The owner allowed the period to expire without paying. 
eƩƣƹ, IhB iƹƤƺƽƸƣƢ ƿƩƣ ƿƣƹƞƹƿƾ ƺƤ ƿƩƣ ƻƽƺƻƣƽƿǄ ƞƟƺǀƿ ƿƩƣ ǀƻơƺƸiƹƨ ƾǀƻƻlǄ 
ƾƿƺƻ ǁiƞ ƺƽƢiƹƞƽǄ ᄬi.ƣ. ƹƺƹ- ƽƣƨiƾƿƣƽƣƢᄭ Ƹƞil ƢƞƿƣƢ ᇻ éƻƽil ᇴᇲᇲᇺ. EƹƣƽƨǄ ƾǀƻƻlǄ 
was then stopped between 23 April and 30 May 2008, for the elevator and hot 
ǂƞƿƣƽ Ɵƺilƣƽ. éƤƿƣƽ IhB ǂƞƾ iƹƤƺƽƸƣƢ ƞƟƺǀƿ ƞ ƻƽƣƨƹƞƹƿ ǂƺƸƞƹ liǁiƹƨ iƹ ƿƩƣ 
property, it resumed electricity supply. 
éơƿiƹƨ ƺƹ ƟƣƩƞlƤ ƺƤ i, ƿƩƣ Bƞƾƣl ƿƣƹƞƹƿƾ’ ƞƾƾƺơiƞƿiƺƹ ƞƻƻƣƞlƣƢ ƟƣƤƺƽƣ ƿƩƣ 
ƾǀƻƣƽiƺƽ ƞƢƸiƹiƾƿƽƞƿiǁƣ ƟƺƢǄ ᄬƿƩƣ BǀilƢiƹƨ DƣƻƞƽƿƸƣƹƿᄭ ƺƹ ᇴᇻ MƞǄ ᇴᇲᇲᇺ. 
Oƹ ᇳᇶ JǀlǄ ᇴᇲᇲᇺ, ƿƩƣ DƣƻƞƽƿƸƣƹƿ ƢiƾƸiƾƾƣƢèᅬ i.ƣ. iƿ ƢiƢ ƹƺƿ ơƺƹƾiƢƣƽ ƺƹ ƿƩƣ 
Ƹƣƽiƿƾèᅬ ƿƩƣ ƽƣƼǀƣƾƿ ƿƺ ƽƣƾǀƸƣ ƾǀƻƻlǄ ƾiƹơƣ ƿƩƣ ƾƿƺƻ ǂƞƾ ƞlƽƣƞƢǄ ƽƣƾơiƹƢƣƢ 
and rejected the prayer for compensatory relief. X unsuccessfully challenged 
this decision before the cantonal government (the Regierungsrat of the can-
ƿƺƹ ƺƤ Bƞƾƣl- dƿƞƢƿᄭ ƞƹƢ, ƾǀƟƾƣƼǀƣƹƿlǄ, ƟƣƤƺƽƣ ƿƩƣ éƻƻƣllƞƿƣ Cƺǀƽƿ ƺƤ ƿƩƣ ơƞƹ-
ƿƺƹ ƺƤ Bƞƾƣl- dƿƞƢƿ. 
X brought the case before the Swiss Federal Supreme Court, claiming that 
his constitutional right to be heard was violated because the supply stop was 
not issued in the form of an administrative act and he was not granted the 
right to take position on the planned measure beforehand although being 
tenant of the property. 
48 BGE ᇳᇵᇹ I ᇳᇴᇲ.
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eƩƣ Cƺǀƽƿ ƣƸƻƩƞƾiǅƣƢ ƿƩƞƿ IhB iƾ lƣƨƞllǄ ƺƟliƨƣƢ ƿƺ ƾǀƻƻlǄ ƣlƣơƿƽiơiƿǄ. 
According to the statutory law, supply may only be refused contingent, inter 
alia, if it does not constitute unreasonable hardship for third parties such as 
the owner’s tenants. Hence, the Court reasoned that ordering such refusal 
interferes with the tenants’ rights. The order thus qualifies as administrative 
act and must be issued as such rather than as real act. Consequently, not only 
property owners but also tenants and other affected persons must be heard 
beforehand and be granted the right to express their objections against the 
admissibility of the planned supply stop (in particular with respect to the 
unreasonable hardship imposed on them). With respect to the information 
lƣƿƿƣƽ ƺƤ ᇻ éƻƽil ᇴᇲᇲᇺ, ƿƩƣ Cƺǀƽƿ ƩƣlƢ ƿƩƞƿ iƿ ǂƞƾ ƹƺ ƾǀƤƤiơiƣƹƿ Ɵƞƾiƾ Ƥƺƽ lƞǄƻƣƽ-
sons to exercise their rights. Hence, the Court found that X’s right to be heard 
was violated.
ᇴ. aإآؘؖؗبإؔ؟ Fؔ؜إءؘئئ: Nؔابإؔ؟؜ئؔا؜آء49
dƻƺǀƾƣƾ é ƞƹƢ B ƞƾ ǂƣll ƞƾ ƿƩƣiƽ ơƩilƢƽƣƹ C ƞƹƢ D ƞƻƻliƣƢ Ƥƺƽ ơiƿiǅƣƹƾƩiƻ iƹ 
the municipality of Weiningen (canton of Zurich). With letter dated 8 October 
ᇴᇲᇳᇴ, ƿƩƣ Ƹǀƹiơiƻƞl Nƞƿǀƽƞliǅƞƿiƺƹ CƺƸƸiƾƾiƺƹ iƹǁiƿƣƢ ƿƩƣ ƤƞƸilǄ Ƥƺƽ ƞ ơƺƹ-
versation which, according to the invitation letter, should serve the purpose 
of getting to know the applicants and their motivation for the naturalization 
process. In reality, however, the Commission assessed the suitability of the 
applicants for citizenship. In the following, the municipality rejected their 
application on the grounds that they are not well integrated into Swiss lifes-
ƿǄlƣ; lƞơkƣƢ ơƺƸƸƞƹƢ ƺƤ ƿƩƣ GƣƽƸƞƹ lƞƹƨǀƞƨƣ; ƞƹƢ ơƺǀlƢ ƹƺƿ ƞƹƾǂƣƽ ƾiƸƻlƣ 
ƨƣƺƨƽƞƻƩiơƞl ƞƹƢ ơiǁiơ Ƽǀƣƾƿiƺƹƾ. é, B, C, ƞƹƢ D ǀƹƾǀơơƣƾƾƤǀllǄ ơƩƞllƣƹƨƣƢ 
ƿƩiƾ Ƣƣơiƾiƺƹ ƟƣƤƺƽƣ ƿƩƣ Diƾƿƽiơƿ Cƺǀƹơil ᄬBezirksrat), i.e. the hierarchically 
higher administrative body, and, subsequently, the Administrative Court of 
the canton of Zurich.
BƣƤƺƽƣ ƿƩƣ dǂiƾƾ FƣƢƣƽƞl dǀƻƽƣƸƣ Cƺǀƽƿ, é, B, C, ƞƹƢ D ƞƽƨǀƣƢ ƿƩƞƿ ƿƩƣiƽ 
ƽiƨƩƿ ƿƺ Ƥƞiƽ ƿƽƣƞƿƸƣƹƿ ᄬéƽƿiơlƣèᇴᇻèI Cƺƹƾƿiƿǀƿiƺƹᄭ ǂƞƾ ǁiƺlƞƿƣƢ ƟǄ Ɵƣiƹƨ iƹǁiƿƣƢ 
to a personal interview and, instead, unexpectedly being examined.
The Court found that procedural guarantees of the Constitution apply in the 
ƹƞƿǀƽƞliǅƞƿiƺƹ ƻƽƺơƣƾƾ, ƹƞƸƣlǄ ƿƩƣ ƽiƨƩƿ ƿƺ Ɵƣ ƩƣƞƽƢ ᄬéƽƿiơlƣèᇴᇻèI Cƺƹƾƿiƿǀƿiƺƹᄭ 
as one aspect of procedural fairness, which also entails the right to receive 
ᇶᇻ BGE ᇳᇶᇲ I ᇻᇻ.
240 Felix Uhlmann: Administrative Procedure
information on the formal and substantive prerequisites of the naturalization 
process. The Court also stated that according to the principle of good faith 
ᄬéƽƿiơlƣèᇷèIII Cƺƹƾƿiƿǀƿiƺƹᄭ, ƻƞƽƿiƣƾ ơƺǀlƢ ƣǃƻƣơƿ ƿƩƣ ƾƿƞƿƣ ƹƺƿ ƿƺ Ƣƣǁiƞƿƣ ƤƽƺƸ 
the announced course of proceedings without prior notice.
Further, the Court stated that it is within the municipal discretion to ask 
questions on general knowledge at some point during the naturalization pro-
cess; however, because of the early stage of the proceedings and the invita-
ƿiƺƹ lƣƿƿƣƽ, é, B, C, ƞƹƢ D ơƺǀlƢ lƣƨiƿiƸƞƿƣlǄ ƣǃƻƣơƿ ƿƩƞƿ ƾǀơƩ ƣǃƞƸiƹƞƿiƺƹ 
would take place later on rather than during the (early) personal interview 
and that they could prepare beforehand. Consequently, the Court held that 
the municipality violated the right to fair proceedings and to be heard, res-
pectively, as well as the principle of good faith. 
Dǀƣ ƿƺ ƿƩƣ ƤƺƽƸƞl ƹƞƿǀƽƣ ƺƤ ƿƩƣ ƽiƨƩƿ ƿƺ Ɵƣ ƩƣƞƽƢ, ƿƩƣ Cƺǀƽƿ ƽƣƻƣƞlƣƢ ƿƩƣ 
challenged decision and referred the case back to the municipality for further 
fact finding and in order to adopt the required procedural steps. 
As already stated above, this case also shows that the right to be heard is a 
flexible instrument that the courts can utilise to intervene against any form 
of unfair administrative process and that is not restricted to certain case 
ƨƽƺǀƻƾ. Iƿ iƾ iƸƻƺƽƿƞƹƿ ƿƺ ƹƺƿƣ ƿƩƞƿ éƽƿiơlƣèᇴᇻèCƺƹƾƿiƿǀƿiƺƹ ƞƻƻliƣƾ ƿƺ all state 
proceedings in civil, penal, and public law within which a decision on indivi-
dual rights and duties is rendered, be it before Courts or non- judicial bodies 
including the government and parliament.ᇷᇲ
ᇵ. D؜إؘؖا C؛ؔ؟؟ؘءؘؚ آؙ Lؘؚ؜ئ؟ؔا؜آء: aآ؟؜ؘؖ Aؖا 
آؙ kبإ؜ؖ؛51
Oƹ ᇷ JǀlǄ ᇴᇲᇲᇸ, ƿƩƣ aƞƽliƞƸƣƹƿ ƺƤ ƿƩƣ ơƞƹƿƺƹ ƺƤ kǀƽiơƩ ƞƢƺƻƿƣƢ ƿƩƣ aƺliơƣ 
Act (Polizeigesetz), a cantonal law which was subsequently approved by the 
voters. The adoption of the Police Act should create statutory bases for the 
performance of the duties and measures of the police force in order to main-
tain public order and safety. Private persons, a lawyer’s association, and 
political parties challenged the Police Act directly before the Swiss Federal 
Supreme Court (abstrakte, direkte Normenkontrolle), claiming that various 
ᇷᇲ See also G؜آةؔءء؜ B؜ؚؚؔ؜ء؜, KƺƸƸƣƹƿƞƽ BǀƹƢƣƾǁƣƽƤƞƾƾǀƹƨ Ƣƣƽ dơƩǂƣiǅƣƽiƾơƩƣƹ 
Eidgenossenschaft, 2nd edition, Zurich 2017, éƽƿiơlƣèᇴᇻ ƹ.èᇵ.
ᇷᇳ BGE ᇳᇵᇸ I ᇺᇹ.
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provisions violate the Federal Constitution, the European Convention on 
Human Rights (ECHR), and the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
rights (ICCPR).
In general, the Court reasoned that it is crucial for the constitutionality of 
cantonal legislation whether it is possible to interpret the cantonal provision 
in a way that is consistent with the constitutional guarantees invoked. 
It is important to note that whereas the Court can only decide on 
whether to rescind or uphold the challenged legislation, its considerations 
predetermine the future (constitutional) application of the Police Act: The 
authorities must act according to the restrictions set out in the considera-
tions of the Court when applying the Police Act in the future, otherwise 
administrative acts or real acts based on the Police Act will be quashed if 
challenged. 
The Court then examined the procedural aspects of the police custody- 
regime in relation to the provisions concerning the requirements for taking 
a person into police custody. As the Police Act did not entail any provisions 
on the legal protection, the general rules of legal protection in the canton of 
Zurich applied, i.e. the affected person had to challenge the custody before 
the superior administrative body. Only after having exhausted these admi-
nistrative remedies an appeal to the Administrative Court of the canton of 
kǀƽiơƩ, i.ƣ. ƞ jǀƢiơiƞl ƟƺƢǄ, ǂƞƾ ƻƺƾƾiƟlƣ. eƩƣ Cƺǀƽƿ ƽƣƞƾƺƹƣƢ ƿƩƞƿ éƽƿiơlƣèᇷèIg 
ECHRᇷᇴ does not bar the member states from implementing administrative 
control before granting access to judicial proceedings, contingent a judicial 
Ƣƣơiƾiƺƹ iƾ ƽƣƹƢƣƽƣƢ “ƾƻƣƣƢilǄ”. Hƺǂƣǁƣƽ, éƽƿiơlƣè ᇵᇳè Ig Cƺƹƾƿiƿǀƿiƺƹ ƾƿƞƿƣƾ 
that any person who has been deprived of their liberty by a body other than 
a court has the right to have recourse to a court at any time which shall then 
decide as quickly as possible on the legality of their detention. The Court rea-
soned that the notion “at any time” means the Court can be invoked directly 
ǂiƿƩƺǀƿ ƻƽiƺƽ ƻƽƺơƣƣƢiƹƨƾ ƟƣƤƺƽƣ ƞƢƸiƹiƾƿƽƞƿiǁƣ ƟƺƢiƣƾ. eƩǀƾ, éƽƿiơlƣèᇵᇲèIg 
Constitution goes beyond the general right to judicial proceedings according 
ƿƺ éƽƿiơlƣè ᇴᇻƞ Cƺƹƾƿiƿǀƿiƺƹ. éƾ ƞ ƽƣƾǀlƿ, ƿƩƣ Cƺǀƽƿ ƩƣlƢ ƿƩƞƿ ƿƩƣ aƺliơƣ éơƿ 
ǁiƺlƞƿƣƾ éƽƿiơlƣè ᇵᇳè Ig Cƺƹƾƿiƿǀƿiƺƹ ƞƹƢ ƽƣƼǀƣƾƿƣƢ ƿƩƣ ơƞƹƿƺƹƞl lƣƨiƾlƞƿƺƽ ƿƺ 
ᇷᇴ Articleèᇷ IV ECHR states that everyone who is deprived of his liberty by arrest or deten-
tion shall be entitled to take proceedings by which the lawfulness of his detention shall 
be decided speedily by a court and his release ordered if the detention is not lawful.
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enact provisions on the legal protections that suffice under the constitutional 
guarantees.ᇷᇵ
ᇶ. “Lؘؚؔ؟ dؔبئؘؚؔ dؔ؟ؔؗ” آإ ا؛ؘ Iؠأآإاؔءؘؖ آؙ 
ا؛ؘ ECHc54
Oƹ ᇴᇶ FƣƟƽǀƞƽǄ ᇳᇻᇻᇺ, ƞƿƿƺƽƹƣǄ- ƞƿ- lƞǂ c ƞƻƻƣƞlƣƢ ƞƨƞiƹƾƿ ƞ ơiǁil lƞǂ Ƣƣơi-
sion of a court of first instance to the High Court of the canton of Zurich. 
His appeal described the proceedings, the challenged decision, the oppo-
sing party, and its counsel by various improper expressions. Inter alia, he 
called the proceedings a “charade” (literally “monkey theatre”, Affentheater) 
and a “legal sausage salad”; described the statement of claim as “ludicrous” 
and “mad- brained”; designated the decision as “sheer nonsense”; called the 
court of first instance a “body of a rogue state”; and stated that the opposing 
counsel was “blathering of the law”. The High Court filed a complaint to 
the Supervisory Commission for Attorneys- at- Law (Aufsichtskommission 
über die Anwältinnen und Anwälte) which initiated a proceeding against 
R. Later, the (then existing) Court of Cassation of the canton of Zurich held 
that the High Court’s decision violated the right to be heard of the party 
represented by R. 
Oƹ ᇶ NƺǁƣƸƟƣƽ ᇳᇻᇻᇻ, ƿƩƣ CƺƸƸiƾƾiƺƹ iƸƻƺƾƣƢ ƞ Ƥiƹƣ ƺƹ c ƞƹƢ ƟƞƽƽƣƢ ƩiƸ 
from exercising his profession for three months because the expressions used 
in his first file were inadmissible under professional ethics and practice rules. 
R’s appeal to the High Court was not successful. He brought the case before 
the Swiss Federal Supreme Court, claiming that the High Court violated 
éƽƿiơlƣèᇸè I ECHc ƟǄ ƹƺƿ ơƞƽƽǄiƹƨ ƺǀƿ ƞ ƻǀƟliơ Ʃƣƞƽiƹƨ Ƣƣƾƻiƿƣ ƞ ơƺƽƽƣƾƻƺƹ-
ding request made by him. He argued that the Commission (which carried 
out such public hearing) did not constitute an independent court as required 
ƟǄ éƽƿiơlƣèᇸèI ECHc.
éƽƿiơlƣèᇸèI ECHc ƣƹƿiƿlƣƾ ƣǁƣƽǄƺƹƣ iƹ ƿƩƣ ƢƣƿƣƽƸiƹƞƿiƺƹ ƺƤ Ʃiƾ ơiǁil ƽiƨƩƿƾ 
and obligations or of any criminal charge against him to a fair and public 
hearing within a reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal 
ᇷᇵ eƩƣ aƺliơƣ éơƿ ǂƞƾ ƿƩƣƹ ƞƸƣƹƢƣƢ ƟǄ ƿƩƣ aƞƽliƞƸƣƹƿ ƺƤ ƿƩƣ ơƞƹƿƺƹ ƺƤ kǀƽiơƩ. NƺǂƞƢƞǄƾ, 
an appeal to the Compulsory Measures Court is available.
ᇷᇶ BGE ᇳᇴᇸ I ᇴᇴᇺ.
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established by law. The Court held that disciplinary proceedings leading to 
ƻƽƺƤƣƾƾiƺƹƞl Ɵƞƹƾ ơƺƹơƣƽƹ “ơiǁil ƽiƨƩƿƾ” ǂiƿƩiƹ ƿƩƣ Ƹƣƞƹiƹƨ ƺƤ éƽƿiơlƣèᇸèI ECHc.
The Court considered the Commission to be closer to an administrative 
body than to a court. Such finding is also supported by the case law of the 
ECHR that focuses on the appearance of the body. Consequently, the Court 
reasoned that the Commission acted as non- judicial body here and that a 
public hearing held only by such body does not meet the requirements impo-
ƾƣƢ ƟǄ éƽƿiơlƣèᇸèI ECHc ƞƹƢ éƽƿiơlƣèᇵᇲ Cƺƹƾƿiƿǀƿiƺƹ, ƽƣƾƻƣơƿiǁƣlǄ. Iƿ ƽƣƤƣƽƽƣƢ 
the case back to the High Court to hold a public hearing in accordance with 
éƽƿiơlƣèᇸèIèECHc ƞƹƢ ƢƣơiƢƣ ƞƨƞiƹ.
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